Son günlerde Avrupa’da Türkiye karşıtı seküler-kutsal bir ittifakın oluştuğu gözleniyor. Türkiye’nin üyeliğine kuşku ile bakanlar veya tamamen karşı çıkanların öne sürdüğü itiraz nedenlerine bakıldığında karşımıza bazı korkular, önyargılar ve tehdit algıları çıkıyor. Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğine karşı kamuoyu oluşturmaya çalışanların her platformda dile getirdiği noktalar arasında Türkiye'nin nüfus büyüklüğü, hızlı nüfus artışı, genç nüfusun oransal yüksekliği, işsizlik, geleneksel ve kültürel kimlik farklılıkları ve Müslümanlık faktörü, Türkiye’nin Batı uygarlığının bir üyesi olmadığı ve karar alma mekanizmalarında sivil olmayan çevrelerin etkinlikleri gibi konuları saymak mümkün. Özellikle Fransa ve Hollanda AB Anayasası’na hayır dedikten sonra Türkiye aleyhtarı olanlar, ellerine büyük bir koz geçmiş gibi çatlak sesler çıkarmaya başladı. Fransızlar ve Hollandalıların Türkiye üye olmasın diye söz konusu Anayasaya hayır dedikleri iddia ediliyor. Bunda kısmen doğruluk payı olmakla beraber bu iki milletin işini gücünü bırakıp Türkiye karşıtlığı yapmaya soyunduğunu söylemek pek yakışık almaz sanırım. Fransa zaten baştan beri Türkiye’nin üyeliği konusuna sıcak bakmıyor. Aynı şekilde Alman muhafazakarları da öyleydi zaten. Şimdi buna bir de yeni seçilen Papa eklendi. Belki de bu Türkiye karşıtı seküler-kutsal ittifakın en belirgin göstergesi.
Şimdi kısaca Türkiye karşıtı seküler-kutsal ittifakın ortak yönlerine bakalım. Hatırlanacapı üzere IPSOS araştırma şirketi tarafından Le Figaro gazetesi için yapılan bir kamuoyu araştırmasında Fransız halkının yüzde 56’sı bir İslam ülkesi olarak gördükleri Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne girmesine karşı olduklarını belirtmişti. Türkiye’nin üyeliğine hayır diyenlerin yüzde 40’ı Türkiye’den bir göç dalgası geleceğini, bunun da istihdam olanaklarını olumsuz etkileyeceği kaygısını taşıdıklarını belirtirken yüzde 26’sı Türkiye’nin bir Asya ülkesi olduğunu ve yüzde 25’i de halkının Müslüman olduğunu belirtmişti. Yaklaşık yüzde 30’luk bir kesim ise dini ve kültürel nedenlerden dolayı Türkiye’nin “asla” üye olmaması görüşünde olduklarını ifade etmiştir. Fransa Başbakan’ı Jean-Pierre Raffarin Türkiye’nin kültürel kimliğine karşı açık bir duruş sergilemiş ve “İslam ırmağının laikliğin nehir yatağına akmasını mı istiyoruz?” sorusuyla din farkından dolayı Türkiye’nin üyeliğine karşı olduğunu ima etmiştir. Diğer yandan AB'nin Hollandalı müzakerecisi Fritez Bulkashtian 'AB'nin Türkiye'nin katılımına izin vermesinin, Avrupa'nın Viyana Savaşı'na boşuna girdiği anlamına geleceği' yollu benzer bir açıklamada bulunmuştur. Gazetelere yansıdığı kadarıyla Papa da yeni yayınlanacak kitabında Türkiye’nin farklı kültürel yapısından dolayı üye olmaması gerektiği yolunda fikirler ileri sürüyormuş. Yani Fransa’nın seküler bloğu, Almanya’nın muhafazakar ekolü ve Katolik dünyanın dini lideri Papa’nın oluşturduğu koalisyon, Türkiye’ye karşı güç birliği yapıyor. Avrupa’nın aydınlama sonrası tarihine bakıldığında seküler ve dini kesimlerin böylesine yakın bir işbirliği yaptıklarını görmek mümkün değil aslında. Seküler dünya görüşü Katolikliğin baskı ve dogmalarına karşı verilen bir mücadelenin ve ruh sınıfının baskısından kurtulmak için verilen bir savaşın ürünüdür. Doğaları, amaçları, dünya ve toplum tasavvurları gereği bu iki kesimin bir araya gelmeleri mümkün değil. Ama her nasılsa Türkiye’nin tam üyelik korkusu bu farklı kesimleri bir araya getirebiliyor. Meğer nelere kadirmiş Türkiye’nin kültürel kimliği.
Biz Türkler bu potansiyeli pek keşfedemedik anlaşılan. Öyle görünüyor ki yabancılar içimizi, dışımızı ve tarihimizi bizden daha iyi biliyor. Türkiye her ne kadar seksen küsur yıllık bir Cumhuriyet olsa da devlet geleneği çok eski olan bir ülkedir. Sanat, kültür, mimari, düşünce, askeri deneyim ve dünyaya açılma gibi konularda çok önemli birikimleri tevarüs etmiştir Türkiye. Bu tarihsel derinlik ve birikim Türklerin kendilerine güven kaynaklarının başında geliyor. Kedine güvenen binlerce Türk bugün Türkiye dışında yaşıyor. Çin’den Romanya’ya kadar uzanan coğrafyada Türkler okul açıyor, yatırım yapıyor, iş kuruyor ve ülkelerini temsil ediyor.
Türkiye’yi sadece iş adamları ve yatırımcılar mı temsil ediyor? Kuşkusuz hayır. Şu anda Avrupa’nın göbeğinde zaten en az dört milyon Türk yaşıyor. Hem de yaşadıkları ülkeye kök salmış durumda bu insanlar. Kimse dört milyon Türkü evinden, işinden el çektirip Türkiye’ye gönderemez. Buna ne Fransa ve Almanya ne de Papa’nın gücü yeter. Çatlak sesler çıksa da çıkmasa da zaten Türkiye Avrupa’da temsil ediliyor. Peki Türkiye söz konusu olduğunda çatlak ses çıkaran ve yan çizen politikacıları ve medya mensuplarını etkileme konusunda dört milyon Avrupalı Türk potansiyel güçlerini yansıtan bir çalışma yapıyor mu? Bu soruya evet diye cevap vermek imkansız.
Avrupalı Türkler, Türkiye aleyhine çıkan çatlak seslerin kısılması için çok şeyler yapabilir aslında. Örneğin yerel ve ulusal medya aracılığıyla Türkiye ve Türkler hakkındaki yanlış imajları düzeltmeye başlayabilirler. Ayrıca siyasal partileri, hükümet üyelerini ve üst düzey karar mekanizmalarını Türkiye konusunda daha olumlu düşünmeye davet edebilirler. Ama bunu yapabilmek için önce Türklerin sahip oldukları sermayeyi yani birikimi keşfetmeleri gerekir. En büyük sermaye nüfus kuşkusuz. Sonra siyasal katılım, sivil toplum örgütleri ve ortak çalışma ruhu. Bütün bunlar devreye sokulduğunda AB’deki Türkiye aleyhtarı çatlak seslerin fazla etkisi kalmayacaktır.
AB ne kadar yan çizerse çizsin Türkiye ile müzakereler 3 Ekim'de başlayacaktır. Bu da Avrupa’daki Türkiye karşıtı seküler-kutsal ittifakla mücadele etmeyi meşru kılmaktadır.
22 Haziran 2005 Çarşamba
Revival of Cultural Legacy in Tatarstan
There is a rediscovery of deeply rooted traditional values in Tatarstan within the context of social and cultural changes in the light of recent developments. One of the most significant sociological events after the disintegration of the Soviet Union was the reconstruction of various religious identities and their institutionalization in society. During the communist era, religious education was banned and numerous religious institutions were closed down because of the communist ideology based on Karl Marx’s views who regarded religions “as opium”. However despite oppressive policies towards religions and imposition of atheist views and positivist education in the schools during the communist era, religions succeeded to survive as sources of collective identity. Social and political events in Tatarstan and elsewhere in the region after the Cold-War period show that despite state repression, Islam preserved its vitality for Muslims. Especially following the expansion of democracy, freedom of religious belief and its expression, Tatar Muslims began to rediscover their Islamic heritage and values.
Cultural and intellectual life among Kazan Tatars was very vibrant at the turn of the 20th century. Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Soviets downgraded and peripheralized non-Russian cultures and people attached to them. Tatar national culture was relegated to a lower level of the cultural evolutionary schema than was Russian culture. The Soviet Union was officially an atheist state and thus sought to stamp out religion from social and cultural life. From the very beginning of its establishment the Soviet state pursued a concerted policy of forcing out religion from public and political life on the one hand and from the life of the individuals on the other hand to create a “New Soviet Man” free from any religious and spiritual references. As part of such a policy of social engineering, Tatarstan’s famous mosques and madrasas were closed; their teachers and scholars were exiled or killed.
Resistance and Revival of Cultural and Religious Identity
Despite concerted campaigns to stamp out religions from the social and cultural fabric of society, neither Islam nor other religions died out. Muslims have resisted cultural, political and economic pressures imposed by the Soviet regime and remained faithful to their national and religious traditions. Beginning of the perestroika has been a turning point for Kazan Tatars and other nations who started to re-claim their national, cultural and religious identity on the one hand and to re-establish their cultural values and religious institutions on the other hand. Implementation of a bilingual education, the creation of Tatarstan citizenship and the establishment of Tatarstan’s Academy of Sciences are some indicators of institutional forms of national revival.
Not only linguistic and cultural elements of Tatar identity but also its religious dimensions found a fertile ground to foster. In the post-Soviet period Islam is viewed as an important component of Tatar national identity and therefore a special argument is made in favor of the strengthening of its symbolic and ideological function.
One of the most symbolic developments in Tatarstan was the reconstruction the Kul Sharif Mosque which was destroyed in 1552 when Ivan the Terrible invaded the Kazan Khanate. Recent data indicate that Muslims of Tatarstan are re-discovering the legacy of Islam and re-building its institutions such as mosques and madrasas as a result of social and political changes following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The reports indicate that the number of mosques here increased from three in 1990 to over 1000 in 2004. According to the data of the Central Administrative Board of the RF Ministry of Justice, there were 1288 religious organizations registered in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan by January 1, 2004. Of these 986 are Muslim and 204. Modern Tatarstan accommodates diversity of faith groups representing various religious traditions that enjoy freedom of religion and conscience. These registered religious communities have established numerous places of worship and temples. Today there are 1014 mosques, 176 Orthodox Churches other religious buildings.
Religious education has also risen in Tatarstan which fills an important vacuum. It is noteworthy to point out that if religious education is not organized, sponsored and consolidated as a source of inculcation of authentic Islam, people will tend to find other sources for information which may lead to undesired developments such as Islam being hijacked by various groups with different agendas. It has already been observed that there are attempts by external groups and movements to infiltrate Tatarstan and impose their understating of Islam which opposes traditional perception of Islam held by Tatars which evolved in contact with various cultural, religious and ethnic groups over the centuries. Lack of religious education or insufficient inculcation of Islam may provide a room for external influences. Therefore state support is extremely important for the provision of proper religious education based on scholarly studies and well prepared curriculum to disable groups and movements who try to infiltrate Tatar society to impose an “imported” interpretation of Islam.
In conclusion, traditional national cultures and religion succeeded to preserve their presence especially in individual consciousness if not institutionally during the Soviet rule which is marked by a systematic repression. Recent developments and contemporary social, cultural and political transformations clearly show that religion is an important force and a source of identity in Tatarstan today. Not only in Tatarstan but around the globe there is an increasing tendency towards religion such as in USA, the Middle East, the East Asia, the South America, the Eastern Europe and in numerous other places. Transnational religious networks are being formed and communication revolution enabled religions to become a global social reality in world politics. One can argue that religion is not simply a cultural heritage or a source of individual/collective identity or merely a set of ritual practices for Muslims in Tatarstan. As the recent social and cultural changes indicate, Islam has an existential value for Muslim believers in Tatarstan providing a weltanschauung for them in public and private realms.
Cultural and intellectual life among Kazan Tatars was very vibrant at the turn of the 20th century. Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Soviets downgraded and peripheralized non-Russian cultures and people attached to them. Tatar national culture was relegated to a lower level of the cultural evolutionary schema than was Russian culture. The Soviet Union was officially an atheist state and thus sought to stamp out religion from social and cultural life. From the very beginning of its establishment the Soviet state pursued a concerted policy of forcing out religion from public and political life on the one hand and from the life of the individuals on the other hand to create a “New Soviet Man” free from any religious and spiritual references. As part of such a policy of social engineering, Tatarstan’s famous mosques and madrasas were closed; their teachers and scholars were exiled or killed.
Resistance and Revival of Cultural and Religious Identity
Despite concerted campaigns to stamp out religions from the social and cultural fabric of society, neither Islam nor other religions died out. Muslims have resisted cultural, political and economic pressures imposed by the Soviet regime and remained faithful to their national and religious traditions. Beginning of the perestroika has been a turning point for Kazan Tatars and other nations who started to re-claim their national, cultural and religious identity on the one hand and to re-establish their cultural values and religious institutions on the other hand. Implementation of a bilingual education, the creation of Tatarstan citizenship and the establishment of Tatarstan’s Academy of Sciences are some indicators of institutional forms of national revival.
Not only linguistic and cultural elements of Tatar identity but also its religious dimensions found a fertile ground to foster. In the post-Soviet period Islam is viewed as an important component of Tatar national identity and therefore a special argument is made in favor of the strengthening of its symbolic and ideological function.
One of the most symbolic developments in Tatarstan was the reconstruction the Kul Sharif Mosque which was destroyed in 1552 when Ivan the Terrible invaded the Kazan Khanate. Recent data indicate that Muslims of Tatarstan are re-discovering the legacy of Islam and re-building its institutions such as mosques and madrasas as a result of social and political changes following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The reports indicate that the number of mosques here increased from three in 1990 to over 1000 in 2004. According to the data of the Central Administrative Board of the RF Ministry of Justice, there were 1288 religious organizations registered in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan by January 1, 2004. Of these 986 are Muslim and 204. Modern Tatarstan accommodates diversity of faith groups representing various religious traditions that enjoy freedom of religion and conscience. These registered religious communities have established numerous places of worship and temples. Today there are 1014 mosques, 176 Orthodox Churches other religious buildings.
Religious education has also risen in Tatarstan which fills an important vacuum. It is noteworthy to point out that if religious education is not organized, sponsored and consolidated as a source of inculcation of authentic Islam, people will tend to find other sources for information which may lead to undesired developments such as Islam being hijacked by various groups with different agendas. It has already been observed that there are attempts by external groups and movements to infiltrate Tatarstan and impose their understating of Islam which opposes traditional perception of Islam held by Tatars which evolved in contact with various cultural, religious and ethnic groups over the centuries. Lack of religious education or insufficient inculcation of Islam may provide a room for external influences. Therefore state support is extremely important for the provision of proper religious education based on scholarly studies and well prepared curriculum to disable groups and movements who try to infiltrate Tatar society to impose an “imported” interpretation of Islam.
In conclusion, traditional national cultures and religion succeeded to preserve their presence especially in individual consciousness if not institutionally during the Soviet rule which is marked by a systematic repression. Recent developments and contemporary social, cultural and political transformations clearly show that religion is an important force and a source of identity in Tatarstan today. Not only in Tatarstan but around the globe there is an increasing tendency towards religion such as in USA, the Middle East, the East Asia, the South America, the Eastern Europe and in numerous other places. Transnational religious networks are being formed and communication revolution enabled religions to become a global social reality in world politics. One can argue that religion is not simply a cultural heritage or a source of individual/collective identity or merely a set of ritual practices for Muslims in Tatarstan. As the recent social and cultural changes indicate, Islam has an existential value for Muslim believers in Tatarstan providing a weltanschauung for them in public and private realms.
Muslims in the West: A Misconstrued Community
European societies are predominantly secular and there is a growing Muslim population in the very heart of secular Europe. Secularized European social life, political culture and public sphere are all facing an enormous challenge of accommodating a relatively religious Muslim from different Muslims countries. Despite settling in Europe many Muslims attach great importance to their sacred and religious values, trying to express their demands and identities in the public spheres.
In the midst of secular Europe there is a growing presence of Muslims in the West with an estimated number between 13 to 15 million comprising more then 35, percent of European population. It’s worth remembering that Europe’s Muslim population is an unintended consequence of labor migration during the postwar labor shortage in the 1950s and 1960s when Turks, Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, and Pakistanis were invited to fill the vacuum in workforce. In the initial period of their employment it was thought that they would return to their home countries once the industry took off and the migrants saved enough money. Therefore labor receiving countries neglected to establish comprehensive policies for the integration of Muslim migrants. Germany for example insisted using the term “guestworker” to indicate that they are meant to go back home. Instead families joined together and a new generation of Muslims emerged in the heart Europe. Since their arrival and settlement in Europe, Muslims have been encountering a number of problems such as being employed in low paid jobs, failure in education, bad housing conditions, racism and discrimination. State policies towards Muslims seem to have contributed to ghettoziation of Muslim communities.
Increasing number of Muslims, their visibility claim-makings as equal citizens in the public sphere is leading to new identity negotiations for Muslims and Europeans. The cover picture of European editions of weekly Time magazine (8 February 2005) which portrayed Mona Lisa with Muslim headscarf lend support to our view that Europeans are also redefining their identity. Muslims also in the process of reconstructing their religious and cultural identity defying the essentialist clichés that Muslims have monolithic identity perception. It is well documented that existence of Muslim in Europe is causing varying reactions on the part of Europeans. Some argue that presence of Muslims strengthens religious diversity, multiculturalism and civilizational dialogue while a conservative minority asserts that Islamisation is becoming Europe’s biggest problem and causing an identity crisis. 9/11, Madrid bombing and murder of Theo van Gogh worsened the image and position of Muslims in Europe. These events seem to have produced a fertile ground for exclusionary views. An Islamophobia emerged and Muslims became targets of hate campaigns. They were mistakenly seen as a threat to national security. It is often recorded and reported that Muslims were primary targets of verbal abuse, physical attacks and harassment in both the USA and Europe right after 9/11. Following the 9/11 attacks, the European Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) found out that Muslim communities have become targets of increased hostility since 11 September.
Now it is time to put aside old prejudices and recover from Islamophobia. It must be noted here that Muslims can not be understood properly unless one discovers the meaning of religion for Muslim communities. Religion is not simply a cultural heritage or a source of individual/collective identity or merely a set of ritual practices for Muslims. Islam has an existential value for Muslim believers providing a weltanschauung for them in public and private realms. It will be possible to establish working relations and sustainable dialogue with Muslims if only Europeans understand the meaning and significance of religion and its existential importance for Muslims.
In the midst of secular Europe there is a growing presence of Muslims in the West with an estimated number between 13 to 15 million comprising more then 35, percent of European population. It’s worth remembering that Europe’s Muslim population is an unintended consequence of labor migration during the postwar labor shortage in the 1950s and 1960s when Turks, Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, and Pakistanis were invited to fill the vacuum in workforce. In the initial period of their employment it was thought that they would return to their home countries once the industry took off and the migrants saved enough money. Therefore labor receiving countries neglected to establish comprehensive policies for the integration of Muslim migrants. Germany for example insisted using the term “guestworker” to indicate that they are meant to go back home. Instead families joined together and a new generation of Muslims emerged in the heart Europe. Since their arrival and settlement in Europe, Muslims have been encountering a number of problems such as being employed in low paid jobs, failure in education, bad housing conditions, racism and discrimination. State policies towards Muslims seem to have contributed to ghettoziation of Muslim communities.
Increasing number of Muslims, their visibility claim-makings as equal citizens in the public sphere is leading to new identity negotiations for Muslims and Europeans. The cover picture of European editions of weekly Time magazine (8 February 2005) which portrayed Mona Lisa with Muslim headscarf lend support to our view that Europeans are also redefining their identity. Muslims also in the process of reconstructing their religious and cultural identity defying the essentialist clichés that Muslims have monolithic identity perception. It is well documented that existence of Muslim in Europe is causing varying reactions on the part of Europeans. Some argue that presence of Muslims strengthens religious diversity, multiculturalism and civilizational dialogue while a conservative minority asserts that Islamisation is becoming Europe’s biggest problem and causing an identity crisis. 9/11, Madrid bombing and murder of Theo van Gogh worsened the image and position of Muslims in Europe. These events seem to have produced a fertile ground for exclusionary views. An Islamophobia emerged and Muslims became targets of hate campaigns. They were mistakenly seen as a threat to national security. It is often recorded and reported that Muslims were primary targets of verbal abuse, physical attacks and harassment in both the USA and Europe right after 9/11. Following the 9/11 attacks, the European Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) found out that Muslim communities have become targets of increased hostility since 11 September.
Now it is time to put aside old prejudices and recover from Islamophobia. It must be noted here that Muslims can not be understood properly unless one discovers the meaning of religion for Muslim communities. Religion is not simply a cultural heritage or a source of individual/collective identity or merely a set of ritual practices for Muslims. Islam has an existential value for Muslim believers providing a weltanschauung for them in public and private realms. It will be possible to establish working relations and sustainable dialogue with Muslims if only Europeans understand the meaning and significance of religion and its existential importance for Muslims.
17 Haziran 2005 Cuma
Kofte in Sultan Ahmet in Istanbul
All visitors come and see Sultan Ahmet where the Topkapı Palace, the Blue Mosque, the Hagia Sophia Museum, the Museum of Islamic Art and many other historical sites are located. It takes you whole day and even more than a day to explore this beautiful corner of Istanbul. You would love to walk through all streets and feel as if you travel through the history. It is an enjoyable but tiring thing to do this and you would get definetly hungry. What I want to say is to you that you must pop in in a restaurant called Tarihi Sultan Ahmet Koftecisi where you can have delicious Kofte (minced meat mixed with herbs).
For futher information on this area visit the following link
http://english.istanbul.gov.tr/
For futher information on this area visit the following link
http://english.istanbul.gov.tr/
Non-Muslim Communities in Turkey
Modern Turkey lies at the crossroads between eastern and western interests. The establishment of a modern Turkey based on Western political models was a watershed in Turkey’s history as an Islamic empire. The early republican elite distanced themselves from the cultural and ideological heritage of the Ottoman Empire and laid the foundational elements of modernization and westernization. However, modern Turkey continues to struggle with finding an appropriate balance between religion and secularism in a nation that is almost entirely Muslim. The establishment of modern Turkey opened a new chapter in history for all Turkish people, including non-Muslim minority communities. The Lausanne Treaty of July 24, 1923, which recognized the establishment of Turkey, had an important effect on the recognition, rights and liberty of religious minority communities in modern Turkey.
Non-Muslim Communities
Several non-Muslim religious groups exist in Turkey, most of which are concentrated in Istanbul and other large cities. Since census results do not contain any data pertaining to the religious affiliation of Turkish citizens, the exact membership figures are not available. However, Table 3 shows that there are more than one hundred thousand estimated non-Muslims in Turkey.
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF NON-MUSLIMS
Religious Affiliation Number
Armenian Orthodox Christians 50 000
Jews 25 000
Greek Orthodox Christians 3 000 – 5000
Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians 15 000
Baha’is 10 000
Protestants 3 000
Armenian Orthodox Christians, Jews, and Greek Orthodox adherents are recognized by the Government as having special legal minority community status under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. However, Baha’is, Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians, Protestants, Bulgarian, Chaldean, Nestorian, Georgian, and Maronite Christians do not have the same status. Article 39 of the Treaty of Lausanne guarantees equality among Turkish citizens regardless of their religious conviction: “Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems. All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.”
In spite of these constitutional provisions, non-Muslim minorities in Turkey have faced property ownership restrictions. On January 3, 2003, the law pertaining to the property of community (non-Muslims minority) foundations was amended, lifting strict restrictions and enabling these foundations to have more freedom in keeping, maintaining, and purchasing new premises. According to the new law ratified by the parliament, community foundations will be able to purchase new property for religious, social, cultural, and educational functions, as well as for providing health services by the permission of The Office of Foundations under more flexible conditions.
Additionally, since the introduction of the Law on Unification of Instruction in 1924, education, including religious education, has been under the supervision of the state. In 1997, the state began requiring eight years of primary school education, which includes religious instruction. However, upon written verification of their non-Muslim background, minorities “recognized” by the government under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty (Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish) are exempt from Muslim religious instruction. Other non-Muslim minorities, such as Catholics, Protestants, and Syriac Christians are not legally exempted; however, in practice, they may obtain exemptions.
One of the long running issues regarding organizational and educational religious liberty in Turkey for a non-Muslim community is the case of the Halki seminary on the island of Heybeliada in the Sea of Marmara. “The seminary has been closed since 1971, when the state nationalized all private institutions of higher learning. The Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul continues to seek to reopen the Halki seminary” to educate religious leaders and to train new clergy to serve the Greek Orthodox community. To meet the training needs for Greek Orthodox clergy, Faculty of Divinity at the University of Istanbul opened a Department of Christian Theology. Still today, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has not made any announcements or any arrangements regarding sending their clergy for training to this department. The Department of Christian Theology, on the other hand, remains defunct because it has not employed any experts or scholars in the field, nor has it made its curricula public. It seems that the issues surrounding the seminary will continue for the foreseeable future.
Starting from the Ottoman Empire, Turkey showed a welcoming attitude towards non-Muslims including Jews fleeing from in the 15th century and from Nazi persecution during WW2. Turkey’s democracy is open to progress and its entry to the European Union will contribute to the process of expanding the democratization process. There are already promising sings with regard to the changes in the law concerning religious liberty and non-Muslim communities in Turkey. Compared to other Muslim nation states, Turkey is an exemplary nation that shows Islam and modern democracy can peacefully coexist. Therefore, instead of pushing Turkey outside the European Union, for the future of democracy and religious liberty Turkey should be encouraged by and welcomed to the European Union.
Non-Muslim Communities
Several non-Muslim religious groups exist in Turkey, most of which are concentrated in Istanbul and other large cities. Since census results do not contain any data pertaining to the religious affiliation of Turkish citizens, the exact membership figures are not available. However, Table 3 shows that there are more than one hundred thousand estimated non-Muslims in Turkey.
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF NON-MUSLIMS
Religious Affiliation Number
Armenian Orthodox Christians 50 000
Jews 25 000
Greek Orthodox Christians 3 000 – 5000
Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians 15 000
Baha’is 10 000
Protestants 3 000
Armenian Orthodox Christians, Jews, and Greek Orthodox adherents are recognized by the Government as having special legal minority community status under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. However, Baha’is, Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians, Protestants, Bulgarian, Chaldean, Nestorian, Georgian, and Maronite Christians do not have the same status. Article 39 of the Treaty of Lausanne guarantees equality among Turkish citizens regardless of their religious conviction: “Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems. All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.”
In spite of these constitutional provisions, non-Muslim minorities in Turkey have faced property ownership restrictions. On January 3, 2003, the law pertaining to the property of community (non-Muslims minority) foundations was amended, lifting strict restrictions and enabling these foundations to have more freedom in keeping, maintaining, and purchasing new premises. According to the new law ratified by the parliament, community foundations will be able to purchase new property for religious, social, cultural, and educational functions, as well as for providing health services by the permission of The Office of Foundations under more flexible conditions.
Additionally, since the introduction of the Law on Unification of Instruction in 1924, education, including religious education, has been under the supervision of the state. In 1997, the state began requiring eight years of primary school education, which includes religious instruction. However, upon written verification of their non-Muslim background, minorities “recognized” by the government under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty (Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish) are exempt from Muslim religious instruction. Other non-Muslim minorities, such as Catholics, Protestants, and Syriac Christians are not legally exempted; however, in practice, they may obtain exemptions.
One of the long running issues regarding organizational and educational religious liberty in Turkey for a non-Muslim community is the case of the Halki seminary on the island of Heybeliada in the Sea of Marmara. “The seminary has been closed since 1971, when the state nationalized all private institutions of higher learning. The Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul continues to seek to reopen the Halki seminary” to educate religious leaders and to train new clergy to serve the Greek Orthodox community. To meet the training needs for Greek Orthodox clergy, Faculty of Divinity at the University of Istanbul opened a Department of Christian Theology. Still today, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has not made any announcements or any arrangements regarding sending their clergy for training to this department. The Department of Christian Theology, on the other hand, remains defunct because it has not employed any experts or scholars in the field, nor has it made its curricula public. It seems that the issues surrounding the seminary will continue for the foreseeable future.
Starting from the Ottoman Empire, Turkey showed a welcoming attitude towards non-Muslims including Jews fleeing from in the 15th century and from Nazi persecution during WW2. Turkey’s democracy is open to progress and its entry to the European Union will contribute to the process of expanding the democratization process. There are already promising sings with regard to the changes in the law concerning religious liberty and non-Muslim communities in Turkey. Compared to other Muslim nation states, Turkey is an exemplary nation that shows Islam and modern democracy can peacefully coexist. Therefore, instead of pushing Turkey outside the European Union, for the future of democracy and religious liberty Turkey should be encouraged by and welcomed to the European Union.
How does Europe deal with religion?
The issue of religion and religious education appear in different contexts in four modernised/secular European countries, based on the grounds of prevailing political cultures. In Germany for example, despite the wide spread image of being a secularised society, the Christian Churches’ entanglements in the state and vice versa are quite far-reaching. The German Constitution’s Preamble cites that trust in God as the moral basis and ends up with enormous financial support that the state collects and spends for the Christian Churches, religion is actually an important power in Germany. The ranges of privileges that the Christian Churches enjoy seem to be unparalleled with other European countries. There is a sharp contrast with France for example. German case can be likened to the case in England where the Crown is the head of the Anglican Church, giving it power and legitimacy. This recognition is reflected in the composition of the House of Lords where there are a number of seats for the clergy of Anglican Church. Religious and political power in Germany, were not separated as early as elsewhere but the Christian Churches, namely the Protestants kept on having a say in public initiatives that would for example in France have belonged exclusively to the sphere of the state; the Churches were especially involved in the construction of the educational system.
In spite of the process of secularisation that has meanwhile taken place, Christianity still serves as powerful moral reference basis and enjoys privileges in education. Christianity and those movements in society that have been substantial for the development towards humanism, freedom and democracy shall get their appropriate space in educating personalities with a consciousness of their own. Religious education in schools is a regular element and it has to be stressed that it is not inter-religious education but confessional doctrine. The German Constitution guarantees religious education as regular subject in public schools, being put into practice by the churches in the frame of subsidiarity (Grundgesetz Articles 7.2 and 140, 141). The Berlin Statutes the other bind the schools to provide two religious education lessons per week and a room for it free of costs. Consequently, the general framing regulations for schools in Berlin name the churches as partners for educational co-operation.
All confessional lessons are subjects of free choice. Islamic religious education does not take place at regular public schools in Germany. Usually, the reason that is given for the absence of Islam in religious education by School Authorities is that Muslims in Germany do not have a common institution like the Christian Churches that could be treated as educational partner according to the principle of subsidiarity. An exception to the negative attitude is the pragmatic development of an Islamic curriculum in the Bundesland of Nordrhein-Westfalen that had been initiated by applications of three Islamic organisations to conduct their lessons in public schools. An alternative for Muslim organisations is the foundation of their own confessional private schools.
The status of religious education as inculcation of Christian heritage contrasts to French case where a deeply rooted laicism does not accommodate appearance of religious signs in public place because religion is seen as a matter of individual conviction. One can, on the other hand, draw some parallels with the British case where Christianity, Protestant confessionalism, is seen as a source of British identity/imaginary. Especially at the beginning of the 19th Century the British self image was predominantly 'Protestant' in nature. For many, a century later this conception remained. This image was re-circulated by a leading article in The Times on 8 July 1980 which wrote that 'The Church of England is the British national Church'. The Rushdie affair was a test case in Britain, which showed that modern Britain was not as much secularised as imagined. With the Rushdie affair, Islam emerged in the public space as a powerful tradition, which contested the tolerance at the core of the British identity. As Ignatieff observes Islam made people realise that civic tolerance, one of the much-praised core of the British identity, was less secular than may people had supposed. He argues that "the almost forgotten Protestantism within the British identity came to the surface. It is the Christian faith, which the Crown is supposed to defend… It was Islam, which broke a key silence in British national identity: why a secular society fails to separate church and state altogether?" As will be seen later in the discussion, this failure showed up itself once more in 1988 Education Reform Act which made religious education compulsory with a main emphasis on Christianity as an important heritage and source of national imagery.
The institutionalisation of religious education (RE) in general and Islamic education in particular took place differently in Britain than Germany. As the Constitution ensures Christian religious education in German public schools, not the Constitution (because it does not exists), but The Education Reform Act 1988 enforces religious education in public schools. The nature of religious education must be dominantly Christian though other religions in Britain should also be taken into consideration[1]. It is the responsibility of local Standing Advisory Council on Religious Education (SACRE) to advise the authority upon matters connected with religious worship in county schools and the religious education in public schools. Concerning the content of RE a different picture emerges in contrast to other compulsory subjects in the National Curriculum. In contrast to the centralisation of the education system through the National Curriculum, RE was decentralised, acknowledging the diversity of religious traditions in Britain.
The formation of SACRE’s led to the production of agreed syllabus that also accommodated diverse religions in addition to Christianity. An agreed syllabus is required "to reflect the fact that the religious traditions of Great Britain are in the main Christian, while taking account of the teachings and practices of the other principal religions represented in Great Britain". The content of the agreed syllabus is influenced by the religions of ethnic communities. Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism were also included in the study of religions. The most significant aspect of religious education in relation to civil culture is expected to promote peace and toleration which fits well with the general image of Britishness being tolerant. One can argue that religious education which represents religions as beliefs systems rather than cultural and political belonging has a potential to stimulate a better understanding of "others", leading to mutual respect and acceptance. This rather contrast to the Dutch tradition where other religions are portrayed as 'far away' cultures.
Muslims in Britain as elsewhere in Europe are getting organised to provide Islamic education for their children in their own schools as well campaigning for more Muslim teachers in public schools. The daily act of collective worship and the content of religious education have become important concerns for Muslim parents. One of the responses of Muslims to the recent developments in the area of education was to establish their own private and independent Islamic schools where not only the National Curriculum subjects but also cultural and religious subjects would be taught. Muslims also wanted to make use of state funds, which are presently available to denominational and Jewish schools. In order to become voluntary-aided schools the Zakaria Girl’s School in Batley and the Islamia School in London, for example, made applications in 1982. However, Zakaria Girl’s and the Islamia School failed to receive recognition as a voluntary-aided school. After the Labour Party's rise to the government, Muslims increased their pressure on authorities for recognition, which is completely unthinkable in France. Despite earlier rejections of its application, the Islamia School persisted in its effort to receive state funds. In a letter published in the education supplement of the Guardian, leading figures campaigning for this state funding appealed to the Secretary of Education and Employment, David Blunkett, for Muslims to be treated equally with others in Britain (2 December 1997). It is argued in the letter that Government backing of Muslim schools would promote shared values and good citizenship for all communities equally. In response to Muslims' demands, the Government decided (9 January 1998) to grant state funding to Islamia School in London and Al Furqan School in Birmingham. The same day, two more Jewish Schools, Mathidla Marks Kennedy and Jewish Progressive primary schools were also given grant-maintained status.
In the Netherlands on the other hand, there is no compulsory explicit religion (Christianity) lessons in public schools. There is, however, an implicit emphasis on the Christian world in history lessons. This emphasis on Christian world echoes the dominant position of Christian establishments in Germany and Britain representing a shared past. All chapters in history books dealing with 'our' world and `our' civilization also make references to aspects of Christianity. As far as explicit aspects of Christianity are concerned, it is a typical history subject.
What Britain and The Netherlands have in common is the fact both countries made available state funds to Muslim schools. It seems that Muslims in the Netherlands achieved their goals more easily. Despite local opposition, Muslims in The Netherlands succeeded in opening state-funded Islamic schools in Rotterdam and Eindhoven in 1988, and over the last six years, the number of Islamic schools has steadily increased in this country to six in 1989-1990, 22 in 1991-92 and 29 in the 1993-1994 school-year. All of these are primary schools.
France can be singled out regarding religion-state relations. Religious education is not a matter of concern in French public schools at all. The principle of laïcité, as understood neutrality towards religious convictions, means that there should be no religious signs in public schools. There is no religious education and crosses or other religious symbols are not allowed in public schools. The wearing of headscarves in most public schools has been forbidden in the name of this principle. Religious education in French public schools is not even imaginable. Religious questions in the public school are not treated as a matter of culture or merely as a belief system but as a matter of civilisation and historical knowledge.
Issue of religion appears for example when foundations of modern civilisation and the influence of oriental civilisation on the western world are discussed. However, Christianity is represented as a strong marker on Western civilisation. Books in the French schools refer 'our language', 'our customs', 'our cultural past', 'our environment' that carry the imprint of Christian traditions. Implication of this narrative is, though the French society is secular, Christianity marks the repertoire of French discourse despite the calculated distance shown in the books.
Diverse approaches to religion in education as a public sphere
This discussion shows that there is a striking difference in the position of religious education and in the extent to which religion is present in the curriculum in Germany, Britain, France and the Netherlands. These differences are to a large extent related to the different political cultures and dominant discourses in the respective countries. In Germany and Britain religious education is more or less a standard ingredient of the curriculum. In both cases religious moral issues are considered to be essential to educate citizens and build up identity, yet in Britain religious education is compulsory, although religious education is mainly on Christianity, other religions are also respected and taught, whereas in Germany the idea of Christian genealogy shines through. In the French case there is no religious education in public schools because French political culture separates state involvement in religious inculcating and nurturing spirituality for religion is a matter of individual conviction that should not interfere in public sphere. In the Netherlands the situation is somewhat different and although there is no compulsory or formally prescribed religious education. Despite the fact that there is no provision for religious education in these two countries, religions nevertheless appear in other subjects. Christian values and influences appear to be the dominant religious heritage whether it is explicitly codified or implicitly implied in the narratives.
On the other hand there is an interesting similarity in the German and French approaches as opposed to the British and Dutch ones. Whereas both Germany and France place one moral standard applicable to all citizens above others, i. e. Christianity in Germany, rationality in France, as it appear in compulsory philosophy lessons, Britain and the Netherlands seem to relate moral standards to the religious and cultural diversity in society. The Dutch political culture establishes a system, which implies that one should teach one's own morals in their own pillar within an overarching (universal) system of equality and non-discrimination. The British political culture on the other encourages the education of morals that should be organised in accordance with the multicultural and multi-religious characteristics of society because British society is composed of communities of values rather than a community of origins as it is the case with Germany.
[1] The 1988 Education Act requires that all new agreed syllabuses ‘must reflect the fact that the religious traditions in Great Britain are in the main Christian whilst taking account of the teaching and practices of the other principal religions represented in Great Britain’ (section 8(3)).
In spite of the process of secularisation that has meanwhile taken place, Christianity still serves as powerful moral reference basis and enjoys privileges in education. Christianity and those movements in society that have been substantial for the development towards humanism, freedom and democracy shall get their appropriate space in educating personalities with a consciousness of their own. Religious education in schools is a regular element and it has to be stressed that it is not inter-religious education but confessional doctrine. The German Constitution guarantees religious education as regular subject in public schools, being put into practice by the churches in the frame of subsidiarity (Grundgesetz Articles 7.2 and 140, 141). The Berlin Statutes the other bind the schools to provide two religious education lessons per week and a room for it free of costs. Consequently, the general framing regulations for schools in Berlin name the churches as partners for educational co-operation.
All confessional lessons are subjects of free choice. Islamic religious education does not take place at regular public schools in Germany. Usually, the reason that is given for the absence of Islam in religious education by School Authorities is that Muslims in Germany do not have a common institution like the Christian Churches that could be treated as educational partner according to the principle of subsidiarity. An exception to the negative attitude is the pragmatic development of an Islamic curriculum in the Bundesland of Nordrhein-Westfalen that had been initiated by applications of three Islamic organisations to conduct their lessons in public schools. An alternative for Muslim organisations is the foundation of their own confessional private schools.
The status of religious education as inculcation of Christian heritage contrasts to French case where a deeply rooted laicism does not accommodate appearance of religious signs in public place because religion is seen as a matter of individual conviction. One can, on the other hand, draw some parallels with the British case where Christianity, Protestant confessionalism, is seen as a source of British identity/imaginary. Especially at the beginning of the 19th Century the British self image was predominantly 'Protestant' in nature. For many, a century later this conception remained. This image was re-circulated by a leading article in The Times on 8 July 1980 which wrote that 'The Church of England is the British national Church'. The Rushdie affair was a test case in Britain, which showed that modern Britain was not as much secularised as imagined. With the Rushdie affair, Islam emerged in the public space as a powerful tradition, which contested the tolerance at the core of the British identity. As Ignatieff observes Islam made people realise that civic tolerance, one of the much-praised core of the British identity, was less secular than may people had supposed. He argues that "the almost forgotten Protestantism within the British identity came to the surface. It is the Christian faith, which the Crown is supposed to defend… It was Islam, which broke a key silence in British national identity: why a secular society fails to separate church and state altogether?" As will be seen later in the discussion, this failure showed up itself once more in 1988 Education Reform Act which made religious education compulsory with a main emphasis on Christianity as an important heritage and source of national imagery.
The institutionalisation of religious education (RE) in general and Islamic education in particular took place differently in Britain than Germany. As the Constitution ensures Christian religious education in German public schools, not the Constitution (because it does not exists), but The Education Reform Act 1988 enforces religious education in public schools. The nature of religious education must be dominantly Christian though other religions in Britain should also be taken into consideration[1]. It is the responsibility of local Standing Advisory Council on Religious Education (SACRE) to advise the authority upon matters connected with religious worship in county schools and the religious education in public schools. Concerning the content of RE a different picture emerges in contrast to other compulsory subjects in the National Curriculum. In contrast to the centralisation of the education system through the National Curriculum, RE was decentralised, acknowledging the diversity of religious traditions in Britain.
The formation of SACRE’s led to the production of agreed syllabus that also accommodated diverse religions in addition to Christianity. An agreed syllabus is required "to reflect the fact that the religious traditions of Great Britain are in the main Christian, while taking account of the teachings and practices of the other principal religions represented in Great Britain". The content of the agreed syllabus is influenced by the religions of ethnic communities. Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism were also included in the study of religions. The most significant aspect of religious education in relation to civil culture is expected to promote peace and toleration which fits well with the general image of Britishness being tolerant. One can argue that religious education which represents religions as beliefs systems rather than cultural and political belonging has a potential to stimulate a better understanding of "others", leading to mutual respect and acceptance. This rather contrast to the Dutch tradition where other religions are portrayed as 'far away' cultures.
Muslims in Britain as elsewhere in Europe are getting organised to provide Islamic education for their children in their own schools as well campaigning for more Muslim teachers in public schools. The daily act of collective worship and the content of religious education have become important concerns for Muslim parents. One of the responses of Muslims to the recent developments in the area of education was to establish their own private and independent Islamic schools where not only the National Curriculum subjects but also cultural and religious subjects would be taught. Muslims also wanted to make use of state funds, which are presently available to denominational and Jewish schools. In order to become voluntary-aided schools the Zakaria Girl’s School in Batley and the Islamia School in London, for example, made applications in 1982. However, Zakaria Girl’s and the Islamia School failed to receive recognition as a voluntary-aided school. After the Labour Party's rise to the government, Muslims increased their pressure on authorities for recognition, which is completely unthinkable in France. Despite earlier rejections of its application, the Islamia School persisted in its effort to receive state funds. In a letter published in the education supplement of the Guardian, leading figures campaigning for this state funding appealed to the Secretary of Education and Employment, David Blunkett, for Muslims to be treated equally with others in Britain (2 December 1997). It is argued in the letter that Government backing of Muslim schools would promote shared values and good citizenship for all communities equally. In response to Muslims' demands, the Government decided (9 January 1998) to grant state funding to Islamia School in London and Al Furqan School in Birmingham. The same day, two more Jewish Schools, Mathidla Marks Kennedy and Jewish Progressive primary schools were also given grant-maintained status.
In the Netherlands on the other hand, there is no compulsory explicit religion (Christianity) lessons in public schools. There is, however, an implicit emphasis on the Christian world in history lessons. This emphasis on Christian world echoes the dominant position of Christian establishments in Germany and Britain representing a shared past. All chapters in history books dealing with 'our' world and `our' civilization also make references to aspects of Christianity. As far as explicit aspects of Christianity are concerned, it is a typical history subject.
What Britain and The Netherlands have in common is the fact both countries made available state funds to Muslim schools. It seems that Muslims in the Netherlands achieved their goals more easily. Despite local opposition, Muslims in The Netherlands succeeded in opening state-funded Islamic schools in Rotterdam and Eindhoven in 1988, and over the last six years, the number of Islamic schools has steadily increased in this country to six in 1989-1990, 22 in 1991-92 and 29 in the 1993-1994 school-year. All of these are primary schools.
France can be singled out regarding religion-state relations. Religious education is not a matter of concern in French public schools at all. The principle of laïcité, as understood neutrality towards religious convictions, means that there should be no religious signs in public schools. There is no religious education and crosses or other religious symbols are not allowed in public schools. The wearing of headscarves in most public schools has been forbidden in the name of this principle. Religious education in French public schools is not even imaginable. Religious questions in the public school are not treated as a matter of culture or merely as a belief system but as a matter of civilisation and historical knowledge.
Issue of religion appears for example when foundations of modern civilisation and the influence of oriental civilisation on the western world are discussed. However, Christianity is represented as a strong marker on Western civilisation. Books in the French schools refer 'our language', 'our customs', 'our cultural past', 'our environment' that carry the imprint of Christian traditions. Implication of this narrative is, though the French society is secular, Christianity marks the repertoire of French discourse despite the calculated distance shown in the books.
Diverse approaches to religion in education as a public sphere
This discussion shows that there is a striking difference in the position of religious education and in the extent to which religion is present in the curriculum in Germany, Britain, France and the Netherlands. These differences are to a large extent related to the different political cultures and dominant discourses in the respective countries. In Germany and Britain religious education is more or less a standard ingredient of the curriculum. In both cases religious moral issues are considered to be essential to educate citizens and build up identity, yet in Britain religious education is compulsory, although religious education is mainly on Christianity, other religions are also respected and taught, whereas in Germany the idea of Christian genealogy shines through. In the French case there is no religious education in public schools because French political culture separates state involvement in religious inculcating and nurturing spirituality for religion is a matter of individual conviction that should not interfere in public sphere. In the Netherlands the situation is somewhat different and although there is no compulsory or formally prescribed religious education. Despite the fact that there is no provision for religious education in these two countries, religions nevertheless appear in other subjects. Christian values and influences appear to be the dominant religious heritage whether it is explicitly codified or implicitly implied in the narratives.
On the other hand there is an interesting similarity in the German and French approaches as opposed to the British and Dutch ones. Whereas both Germany and France place one moral standard applicable to all citizens above others, i. e. Christianity in Germany, rationality in France, as it appear in compulsory philosophy lessons, Britain and the Netherlands seem to relate moral standards to the religious and cultural diversity in society. The Dutch political culture establishes a system, which implies that one should teach one's own morals in their own pillar within an overarching (universal) system of equality and non-discrimination. The British political culture on the other encourages the education of morals that should be organised in accordance with the multicultural and multi-religious characteristics of society because British society is composed of communities of values rather than a community of origins as it is the case with Germany.
[1] The 1988 Education Act requires that all new agreed syllabuses ‘must reflect the fact that the religious traditions in Great Britain are in the main Christian whilst taking account of the teaching and practices of the other principal religions represented in Great Britain’ (section 8(3)).
Turkey's Journey to European Union
Turkey occupies a unique place among the modern nation-states not only because of its geopolitical area but also because of its cultural and religious heritage. Turkey's unique position is strengthened by the fact that it lies at the crossroads of the diverse cultural and religious traditions of the East and West. The political and cultural identity of modern Turkey emerged under the influence of domestic and external forces and traditions that existed in and around Turkey throughout the centuries. These multiple traditions played a major role in the construction of the political and cultural identity of Turkish society.
Modern Turkey was established from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and inherited an imperial legacy that launched modern reforms during the eighteenth century in political, legal, administrative, educational, and cultural fields. The founders of the republic of Turkey adopted these reforms and accelerated the modernization process in Turkish society. The establishment of a modern nation-state in Turkey crystallized the ideological orientation of the republican elite aimed at reshaping the state and its institutions on the basis of a secular model inspired by the West. Political, social, and religious developments in modern Turkey were influenced by the ideals of modernism and secularism. Although some of the radical reforms and restrictive policies of the early republican period caused a cultural rupture, the fabric of the society preserved the resources and cultural references that make up Turkey's unique identity.
Nevertheless, despite sweeping reforms leading to the modernization and secularization of Turkey, Islamic values remained deeply rooted in Turkish society. However Islam is not a monolithic religion in Turkey. Although the majority of the Muslim population belong to the Sunni interpretation of Islam, current perception and practice of Islam varies from mystical to folk Islam and from conservative to more moderate Islam because Turkish society was exposed to various cultural currents throughout the centuries. Additionally, Islamic moral values are vigorously upheld within the patriarchal structures of traditional Turkish families.
Secularization and westernization could not perform the metaphysical function of a religion. Private religious education, the development of Islamic fashion and dress, the production of religious music, and the publication of Islamic journals as aspects of the privatization wave have given Islam a new boost and made it pervasive in modern Turkish society. Social changes such as migration from rural to urban settlement areas, rapid demographic change, multi-party politics, and economic and industrial developments have all affected the revival of Islam in Turkey.
Although Turkey has improved its democracy since its establishment, problems regarding state-religion relations still remain. Although secularism is defined as a separation of state and religion in Turkey, the state ideology not only permeates public institutions, but it also draws the boundaries of the public domain. Certainly Turkish democracy still requires improvement to become more inclusive and accommodating of religions and to find an appropriate balance between religion and secularism in a nation that is almost entirely Muslim. Nevertheless, Turkey is an exemplary nation that shows Islam and modern democracy can peacefully coexist. Now, Turkey is moving a step further to improve its democracy and to empower its citizens by introducing numerous reforms to join the European Union as a full member state.
Modern Turkey was established from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and inherited an imperial legacy that launched modern reforms during the eighteenth century in political, legal, administrative, educational, and cultural fields. The founders of the republic of Turkey adopted these reforms and accelerated the modernization process in Turkish society. The establishment of a modern nation-state in Turkey crystallized the ideological orientation of the republican elite aimed at reshaping the state and its institutions on the basis of a secular model inspired by the West. Political, social, and religious developments in modern Turkey were influenced by the ideals of modernism and secularism. Although some of the radical reforms and restrictive policies of the early republican period caused a cultural rupture, the fabric of the society preserved the resources and cultural references that make up Turkey's unique identity.
Nevertheless, despite sweeping reforms leading to the modernization and secularization of Turkey, Islamic values remained deeply rooted in Turkish society. However Islam is not a monolithic religion in Turkey. Although the majority of the Muslim population belong to the Sunni interpretation of Islam, current perception and practice of Islam varies from mystical to folk Islam and from conservative to more moderate Islam because Turkish society was exposed to various cultural currents throughout the centuries. Additionally, Islamic moral values are vigorously upheld within the patriarchal structures of traditional Turkish families.
Secularization and westernization could not perform the metaphysical function of a religion. Private religious education, the development of Islamic fashion and dress, the production of religious music, and the publication of Islamic journals as aspects of the privatization wave have given Islam a new boost and made it pervasive in modern Turkish society. Social changes such as migration from rural to urban settlement areas, rapid demographic change, multi-party politics, and economic and industrial developments have all affected the revival of Islam in Turkey.
Although Turkey has improved its democracy since its establishment, problems regarding state-religion relations still remain. Although secularism is defined as a separation of state and religion in Turkey, the state ideology not only permeates public institutions, but it also draws the boundaries of the public domain. Certainly Turkish democracy still requires improvement to become more inclusive and accommodating of religions and to find an appropriate balance between religion and secularism in a nation that is almost entirely Muslim. Nevertheless, Turkey is an exemplary nation that shows Islam and modern democracy can peacefully coexist. Now, Turkey is moving a step further to improve its democracy and to empower its citizens by introducing numerous reforms to join the European Union as a full member state.
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