Turkey has a unique experience in state formation, in formulating state-religion relations, but some painful periods in its history regarding democratization. The military intervention on Sept. 12, 1980 suspended Turkey's fragile democracy and caused a breakdown in party politics by banning all political parties and sending their leaders to trial. The first election after the military coup in 1983 was a turning point in Turkish political history, and the election results and subsequent government policies under Turgut Ozal's premiership changed the course of Turkish political culture for decades to come. Ozal's center-right liberal-conservative Motherland Party (then called ANAP, now ANAVATAN) launched a liberalization and democratization policy in Turkey, which facilitated the expression of Islam in the public sphere to a greater degree than before. As part of its policy, the government deleted Articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Constitution to lift obstacles to freedom of thought. ANAP also adopted a free market economy through a large-scale privatization movement.
The general elections on Dec. 24, 1995 were a turning point in Turkey's modern political history. The elections resulted in the reconfiguration of religion and politics in the public sphere. Political developments soon after the elections, as well as the efforts of the Welfare Party (RP) to form a government, preoccupied Turkish citizens regardless of their political preference or their degree of religiosity. The RP's victory marked political history because for the first time since the foundation of the Turkish Republic a religiously oriented party had claimed a majority. The rise of the RP meant that the political rhetoric of a religiously oriented party received large popular support.
After the establishment of a coalition government with the center-right True Path Part (DYP), the secularist-Islamist divide in the political spectrum became more visible to the public. This was due in part to the lack of trust between the two camps. Although the leader of RP, Necmettin Erbakan, changed some of his hostile discourses towards the West and Israel, he failed to convince the secular elite and the military about his party politics. His foreign policy preferences were also a source of discontent among the secular elite in Turkey. On February 28, 1997, Turkey's National Security Council (MGK) "recommended" to Erbakan in ultimatum form a number of stern measures to guard the secular nature of the state, which Erbakan eventually signed after several days' resistance. Erbakan's own political downfall began with his resignation from office in June 1997. The Turkish Constitutional Court abolished the RP in January 1998, again finding constitutional violations of secularism.
After the dissolution of the Welfare Party, the ex-members of the outlawed party formed a new group called the Virtue Party (FP). This party adhered to a political ideology identical to that of the RP. However, on March 22, 1999, the state prosecutor filed an indictment for the banning of the FP, claiming that it supported anti-secular opinions and represented the ideologies of a banned party. Despite this reaction to the rise of the FP, none of the long-running problems regarding religious liberty came to an end during the party's existence or during the coalition government's term in office after the 1999 elections.
The first parliamentary session after the 1999 elections was a test case for Turkish democracy because it set the limits of presence and expression of religious identity in the public sphere. The public sphere is still under the control of state ideology, rather than being an open domain for discussion regarding legitimacy and resources on the basis of mutual respect and understanding. As noted by Professor Nilufer Gole, "The public sphere is institutionalized and imagined as a site for the implementation of a secular and progressive way of life. An authoritarian modernism -- rather than bourgeois, individualist liberalism -- underpins this public sphere. Religious signs and practices have been silenced as the modern public sphere has set itself against the Muslim social imaginary and segregated social organization; modern codes of conduct have entered public spaces ranging from Parliament and educational institutions to the street and public transportation."
While the "unspoken, implicit borders and the stigmatizing, exclusionary power of the secular public sphere" consolidated its power, the Constitutional Court banned the Virtue Party on June 22, 2001 "on charges of being a center of Islamic fundamentalism" and for being a "focal point" for anti-secular activities. Soon after the end of the FP, the Felicity Party (SP) began representing the traditional old ideology. However, divisions of opinion within the party caused a breakdown in the rank and file of the party, ultimately resulting in the establishment of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a former mayor of Istanbul. The AKP won the Nov. 3, 2002 early elections with 34.28 percent of the vote, and claimed a majority in Parliament
The AKP leadership has been very reluctant to take a stand on the state-religion relationship and secularism. Party officials refrain from talking about current problems regarding restrictions on expression of religion in the public sphere to avoid increasing the tension between the secular and the more religiously oriented sectors of society. For instance, Erdogan and other party officials categorically emphasized that overturning the prohibition on wearing headscarves would not be their priority in the office, arguing that this problem can only be solved through a social and political consensus, rather than by causing conflict and tension. Since the establishment of the AKP government in November 2002, the government has focused not on restrictions on religion, but on wider issues, such as Turkey's entry into the European Union, democratization reforms, economic progress, and the recent regional crisis involving Iraq and the Palestinian question. The AKP government not only remained silent with regard to restrictions on Islam in the public sphere, but it has also avoided addressing problems of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey.
Although approximately 98 percent of the population in Turkey is Muslim, Islam is not a monolithic religion in Turkey. Moreover there are several non-Muslim religious groups in Turkey, most of which are concentrated in Istanbul and other large cities. Since census results don't contain any data on the religious affiliation of Turkish citizens, the exact membership figures are not available. Armenian Orthodox Christians, Jews, and Greek Orthodox adherents are recognized by the government as having special legal minority community status under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. However, Baha'is, Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians, Protestants, and Bulgarian, Chaldean, Nestorian, Georgian, and Maronite Christians do not have the same status.
In spite of these constitutional provisions, non-Muslim minorities in Turkey have faced property ownership restrictions. On Jan. 3, 2003, the law pertaining to the property of community (non-Muslim minority) foundations was amended, lifting strict restrictions and enabling these foundations to have more freedom in keeping, maintaining, and purchasing new premises. Under the new law passed by Parliament, community foundations will be able to purchase new property for religious, social, cultural, and educational functions, as well as for providing health services by the permission of the Foundations Directorate under more flexible conditions.
One of the long-running issues regarding organizational and educational religious liberty in Turkey for a non-Muslim community is the case of the Halki seminary on the island of Heybeliada in the Sea of Marmara. The seminary has been closed since 1971, when the state nationalized all private institutions of higher learning. The Ecumenical patriarch in Istanbul continues to seek to reopen the Halki seminary to educate religious leaders and to train new clergy to serve the Greek Orthodox community. To meet the training needs of Greek Orthodox clergy, the Faculty of Divinity at the University of Istanbul opened a Department of Christian Theology which remains defunct. It seems that the issues surrounding the seminary will continue for the foreseeable future.
In conclusion, although Turkey has improved its democracy since its establishment, problems regarding state-religion relations still remain to some degree. The state ideology not only permeates public institutions, but it draws the boundaries of the public domain. Certainly Turkish democracy still requires improvement to become more inclusive and accommodating of religions and to find an appropriate balance between religion and secularism in a nation that is almost entirely Muslim. However, freedom of religion should not only cover Muslims but also all faith groups in Turkey, because it is a universal human right.
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